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courage is contagious

Viewing cable 07CAIRO974, XXXXXXXXXXXX MP ON PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the [structure of a cable](#) as well as how to [discuss them](#) with others. See also the [FAQs](#)

Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cable's unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#07CAIRO974**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
07CAIRO974	2007-04-04 17:17	2011-08-30 01:44	SECRET	Embassy Cairo

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9135>
<http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9164>
<http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9146>
<http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9147>
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<http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10073>
<http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10185>

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4450
INFO RUEHXX/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 000974

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NSC FOR WATERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2047

TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM EG
SUBJECT: XXXXXXXXXXXX MP ON PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION

REF: A. 2006 CAIRO 4612
1B. 2006 CAIRO 6600

Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Economic and Political Affairs,
William R. Stewart, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

11. (C) Summary: In a recent meeting with poloff, XXXXXXXXXXXX
parliamentarian XXXXXXXXXXXX discussed presidential son Gamal Mubarak's
possible succession of his father, and opined that Gamal
increasingly views Minister of Defense Mohamed Hussein
Tantawi and EGIS head Omar Suleiman as a threat to his
presidential ambitions. XXXXXXXXXXXX alleged that Tantawi recently
told him, in confidence, of his deepening frustration with
Gamal. End summary.

GAMAL ANGLING TO "GET RID" OF HIS COMPETITION

12. (S) On March 29, XXXXXXXXXXXX noted to poloff his assessment that
the recently approved constitutional amendments package is
largely aimed at ensuring Gamal Mubarak's succession of his
father, and "a more controllable, stable political scene when
he does take the reins." Opining that "Gamal and his clique"
are becoming more confident in the inevitability of Gamal's
succession, and are now angling to remove potential
"stumbling blocks," XXXXXXXXXXXX said that speculation among Cairo's
elite is that there could be a cabinet reshuffle as soon as
May or June, in which Minister of Defense Tantawi and/or EGIS
head Omar Suleiman would be replaced. "Those two are
increasingly viewed as a threat by Gamal and those around
him," and thus Gamal is reportedly pushing Mubarak to get
them out of the way, so they "could not pose any problems" in
the event of a succession. XXXXXXXXXXXX speculated that "hitches"
to a Gamal succession could occur if Mubarak died before
installing his son: "Gamal knows this, and so wants to stack
the deck in his favor as much as possible now, while Mubarak
is firmly in control, just in case his father drops dead
sooner rather than later."

13. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX said XXXXXXXXXXXX had commented to him in a recent
private meeting that, "he has had it 'up to here' with Gamal
and his cronies, and the tremendous corruption they are
facilitating." XXXXXXXXXXXX told me he is having trouble sleeping
at night," he continued, "and that he cannot stand what has
happened to the country, and what may yet happen to the
country." Disappointed by the recent constitutional
amendments, and skeptical about the will of either Mubarak or
Gamal to push forward meaningful political reforms, XXXXXXXXXXXX
said he viewed a post-Mubarak military coup as "the best
possible way out for Egypt ... we are in a terrible spot, and
that is the best of all the bad options available." (Note:
XXXXXXXXXXXX provided no further details about a possible coup
scenario, and appeared to simply be theorizing about the
future. To date, we have not heard other interlocutors
speculate about a possible coup option. End note).

CURRENT GOSSIP IN PARLIAMENT

14. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that parliamentarians are abuzz over rumors
that, under newly amended constitutional Article 136 (which
now gives the president the ability to dissolve the People's
Assembly by executive decree alone, without a national
referendum), the People's Assembly will be dissolved in
roughly a year, so as to rid it of the "troublesome" 88
Muslim Brotherhood MP's. New elections would then be held,
but "as under the new constitutional amendments, there will
be no direct judicial supervision of elections to help to
guard against fraud, the government can be expected to
engineer the results" so that there are far fewer MB MP,s in
the new parliament. "The government is happy to deal with
fairly tame and non-threatening oppositionists such as
XXXXXXXXXXXX, Wafd, and Taggamu. But they do not want such a
powerful bloc of MB MP,s to remain, particularly when they
would make the most noise in the event of a Gamal succession."

15. (C) In terms of his personal political aspirations, XXXXXXXXXXXX
told poloff he has XXXXXXXXXXXX the XXXXXXXXXXXX, founded by XXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXX

16. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that hisXXXXXXXXXXXX (per ref B, a
XXXXXXXXXXXX), is XXXXXXXXXXXX at the XXXXXXXXXXXX, due to what XXXXXXXXXXXX termed the continuing XXXXXXXXXXXX. According
to XXXXXXXXXXXX, MinDef Tantawi called him XXXXXXXXXXXX to
ensure that XXXXXXXXXXXX was satisfied as to how XXXXXXXXXXXX was being
XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX said he engaged XXXXXXXXXXXX with XXXXXXXXXXXX, asking him to help get XXXXXXXXXXXX, as he has already XXXXXXXXXXXX
"XXXXXXXXXXXX" XXXXXXXXXXXX allegedly checked with XXXXXXXXXXXX,
then replied that XXXXXXXXXXXX cannot be XXXXXXXXXXXX before he XXXXXXXXXXXX, as, "we are under terrible foreign pressure to
XXXXXXXXXXXX, so cannot XXXXXXXXXXXX, as they will
then criticize us for not XXXXXXXXXXXX too." XXXXXXXXXXXX
subsequent suggestion to XXXXXXXXXXXX both XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX went
unheeded. However, XXXXXXXXXXXX allegedly told XXXXXXXXXXXX that he had
instructed XXXXXXXXXXXX to not
undertake any procedures to divest XXXXXXXXXXXX of his
XXXXXXXXXXXX; XXXXXXXXXXXX
therefore believes XXXXXXXXXXXX will be able to re-assume XXXXXXXXXXXX

17. (S) Comment: While XXXXXXXXXXXX is a useful interlocutor and a
well-placed parliamentarian, we stress that he is the only
Embassy contact to date who has raised with us the spectre of
a post-Mubarak military coup. While discussion of
presidential succession is a favorite parlor game in Cairo
salons, hypothesizing about the acutely sensitive topic of a
coup is certainly not regularly undertaken in Egyptian
circles.

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